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Abstract
Derrida’s work encompasses dynamic spatial dimensions to understand-
ing as a pervasive theme, including the search for a ‘new psychoanalytic
graphology’ in Writing and Difference. This preoccupation with a
spatial text for repression also occurs later in Archive Fever. Building
on Derrida, this paper seeks to develop key aspects of a new dynamic
psychoanalytic graphology through diametric and concentric interac-
tive spatial relation. These spatial movements emerge from a radical
reconstruction of a neglected aspect of structural anthropologist Lévi-
Strauss’ work on spatial relations prior to myth. This psychoanalytic
graphology is argued to silently pervade Freud’s own direct accounts of
repression. This graphological domain is developed through diametric
and concentric spatial movements across common concerns of Derrida
and Freud such as inversions, interruption and restoration, regarding
traces in the unconscious. A spatial text is uncovered for diverse features
of Freudian repression, including ambivalence in obsessional neurosis
and psychosis, splitting of the ego and repetition compulsion. This
psychoanalytic graphology challenges the construction of a restricted
subjectivity based on repressive diametric spatial relations. It goes
beyond Freud’s logocentric repression, resonant with Derrida’s more
radical call for a wider spatio-temporal understanding of structures of
differential relation, prior to causality and myth.
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*
A pervasive theme throughout much of Jacques Derrida’s work is an
engagement with dynamic spatial dimensions to understanding. They
are spatial movements that are always somewhat hors de vue. Derrida
is at the threshold of an entirely other text. This text involves a
spatial opening prior to language, and yet, seeped into language. A
preoccupation with space encompasses not only his earlier work such
as Writing and Difference but also later interrogations in Archive Fever.
A common thread in these works is an engagement with interpreting
Freud’s conceptions of the unconscious in spatial terms. He seeks ‘a new
psychoanalytic graphology’, suggesting tentatively that Melanie Klein’s
work ‘perhaps opens the way’ (Derrida 1981, 231).
Building on Derrida, this paper seeks to develop key aspects of such
a new dynamic psychoanalytic graphology through specific candidate
structures of interactive spatial relation. This psychoanalytic graphology
is argued to be a pervasive, and yet implicit, feature of Freud’s
own direct accounts of repression. It occurs at a level of systemic
interactions identified by Derrida, a level prior to Freud’s typically
causal preoccupations. This paper excavates a common domain of
preoccupation for both Derrida and Freud in relation to repression,
including spatial dimensions underlying inversions, connection and
separation. I will argue that a key mediating insight to bridge Freud
and Derrida’s concerns emerges from a radical reconstruction of a
somewhat neglected aspect of structural anthropologist Claude Lévi-
Strauss’ (1966; 1963; 1977) work on spatial relations prior to myth,
namely, interactions between diametric and concentric structures of
relation (see below Figure 1 and Figure 2). A diametric spatial opposition
is one where a circle is split in half by a line which is its diameter, or
where a square or rectangle is similarly divided into two equal halves. In
concentric spatial relation, one circle is inscribed within another larger
circle; in pure form, the circles share a common central point.
Derrida recognizes that at least some dimensions to Lévi-Strauss’ work
on myth harmonize with his own preoccupations. In opening a space for
a supposedly entirely other text, Derrida invites scrutiny of a level prior
to myth. Commenting on Lévi-Strauss’ discourse on myths, Derrida
observes: ‘What appears most fascinating in this critical search for a
new status of discourse is the stated abandonment of all reference to
a center, to a subject, to a privileged reference, to an origin, or to an
absolute archia’ (Derrida 1981, 286). Derrida extols the virtues of this
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Figure 1. Diametric dualism.
Figure 2. Concentric dualism.
development in Lévi-Strauss’ The Raw and the Cooked: ‘From the very
start, Lévi-Strauss recognizes that the Bororo myth which he employs
in the book as the ‘reference myth’ does not merit this name and this
treatment’ (Ibid. 286). Derrida continues:
There is no unity or absolute source of the myth. The focus of the
source of the myth are always shadows and virtualities which are elusive,
unactualizable and nonexistent in the first place. Everything begins with
structure, configuration or relationship. The discourse on the acentric
structure that myth itself is, cannot itself have an absolute subject or an
absolute center. (Ibid. 286)
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There is no myth as a still point of the turning world. There
is no Archimedean point for myth. A fundamental reference point
has been expelled from a mythical Eden of the mythic. If myths
transform one into another and it is the relation or structure of
myths that is more fundamental, this requires further interrogation of
this background relation. This invites a renewed focus on spatial and
temporal dimensions.
Within a guiding structuralist framework in anthropology, Lévi-
Strauss explicitly locates diametric spatial structures not only within
myths but prior to them as an implicit organizing discourse. Lévi-
Strauss uncovers diametric opposition as being a reversal, while
describing ‘symmetrical inversions’ (Lévi-Strauss 1977, 247) in a space
of differential relation for Mandan and Hidatsa myths:
these myths are diametrically opposed . . . In the Mandan version . . . two
earth women who are not sisters go to heaven to become sisters-in-law by
marrying celestial brothers. One who belongs to the Mandan tribe, separates
from an ogre, Sun, with the help of a string which enables her to come back
down to her village. In revenge, Sun places his legitimate son at the head
of the enemies of the Mandan, upon whom he declares war. In the Hidatsa
version . . . everything is exactly reversed. Two celestial brothers come down
to earth to be conceived by human beings and born as children. Sun’s sister,
an ogress, is joined with an earthborn character by means of a string. She
makes him her adopted son and puts him at the head of the enemies of the
Hidatsa. (Ibid. 250)
Lévi-Strauss reiterates a view of diametric spatial structural opposition
as expressing qualities of inverted symmetry, when contrasting the myth
of the Thompson and the Coeur d’Alene with that of the Chilcotin (Ibid.
262). Echoing a view of symmetry as ‘transformations which sometimes
result in the meaning being turned inside out’ (Ibid. 260), he invokes
descriptions of myths, framed by a spatial understanding of their relation
as involving, what amounts to a mirror image:
One often observes . . . that mythological systems after passing through a
minimal expression, recover their original fullness on the other side of the
threshold. But their reflection is inverted a bit like a bundle of light rays
entering into a camera obscura through a pin-point opening and forced by this
obstacle to cross over each other. The same image seen rightside-up outside
is reflected upside-down in the camera. (Ibid. 259, 260)
Strictly speaking, a mirror image is plane symmetry, rather than the
line symmetry of diametric dualism. Nevertheless, diametric plane, line
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and point symmetry all accommodate a view of symmetry as reversal or
inversion. It is both a two-dimensional and three-dimensional text.
Observed by Lévi-Strauss as structures underlying myths and as social
structures in space, Lévi-Strauss did not make the radical conceptual
leap to examining this ancient structure of diametric relation as giving
expression to emotional dimensions and repression in the unconscious.
This is despite Freud’s account, in his Introductory Lectures of 1916–17,
of resistance and repression in similar terms of a kind of inverted
symmetry, echoing also his Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1910a,
25–27):
Every mental process . . . [except external perception] exists to begin with in
an unconscious stage or phase . . . it is only from there that the process passes
over into the conscious phase, just as a photographic picture begins as a
negative and only becomes a picture after being turned into a positive. Not
every negative, however, necessarily becomes a positive; nor is it necessary
that every unconscious mental process should turn into a conscious one.
(Freud 1916–17, 295)
Freud’s underlying vision here is that meaning is, as in Lévi-Strauss’
words, ‘turned inside out’.
*
Derrida’s concern with time, memory and the unconscious archive
examines a spatial dimension, as the archive is ‘already a psychic
spacing’ (Derrida 1996a, 91–92): ‘The archive takes place at the place of
originary and structural breakdown of the said [“spontaneous, alive”]
memory’ (Ibid. 11). For Derrida, understanding of the archive is key
to the conceptualization of repression to unlock a domain prior to
‘logocentric repression’ (Derrida 1981, 197) and purportedly antecedent
to individual repression. Referring to Freud’s Project for a Scientific
Psychology (1895), Derrida prioritises focus on spatial concerns:
we repeatedly find a persistent attempt to account for the psyche in terms of
spacing, a topography of traces, a map of breaches; and we repeatedly find
an attempt to locate consciousness or quality in a space whose structure and
possibility must be rethought. (Derrida 1981, 205)
Commencing with diametric spatial relations, such as mirror image
inverted symmetry, a key issue is how this proposed psychoanalytic
graphology implicitly pervades Freudian accounts of repression and the
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unconscious. Further to this, it is necessary to comprehend why such
Freudian accounts are insufficient as merely logocentric repression, and
what Derrida is adding beyond this.
For Freud, the diphasic pattern of reactive prohibition and substitutive
satisfaction, as well as the mirror image inversion between passive
and active roles, are features of obsessional neurosis. In Wolf Man,
Freud strongly emphasises the interplay of two diametrically opposing
states, ‘sadistic aggressiveness towards the father and a tender passive
attitude to him’ which ‘form a pair of opposites’ (Freud 1925–26,
106). The passive orientation is a mirror image of the active one
involved in aggression, likewise the tender attitude towards the father
and the sadistic attitude towards him. Each is both an instantiation
of a repressive principle and a denial of the other repressive principle.
Significantly, Freud goes so far as to recognize that repression is itself
divided, for example, in such cases of obsessional neurosis, into two
conflicting processes (Ibid. 106). Freud extends this dualistic structure,
in effect, making it a general feature of obsessional neurosis:
The symptoms belonging to this [obsessional] neurosis fall, in general, into
two groups, each having an opposite trend. They are either prohibitions,
precautions and expiations – that is, negative in character – or they are, on the
contrary, substitutive satisfactions which often appear in symbolic disguise.
(Ibid. 112)
The reaction to prior trauma tends to impose a diametric opposition
of a repressive split between trauma and reactive prohibition, precaution
and/or expiation. In his comments on Freud’s Rat Man case, Sherwood
implies that this inverted symmetry insight of Freud challenges
conventional Western logic: ‘And why should the patient have felt such
remorse at the father’s death if he hated him? It is items like these which
present at least a prima facie incongruity’ (Sherwood 1969, 222). Freud
in effect conceptualises beyond Western A/Non-A logic with mirror
image structures.
Diametric projection underlies the spatial structure of play highlighted
in Freud’s (1920) account of his grandson Ernst’s game of fort-
da inviting an interplay of disappearance-return of a wooden reel.
According to Freud, the child compensated himself for the instinctual
renunciation he had made in allowing his mother to go away, without
protesting, by staging the disappearance and return of the objects within
his reach. Turning his experience into a game: ‘At the outset he was
in a passive situation – he was overpowered by the experience; but by
repeating it, unpleasurable though it was, as a game, he took on an active
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part’ (Freud 1920, 16). Freud conceptualised the function of repetitive
play as the child becoming an active ‘master of the situation’, through
repeating that which had left a significant emotional impression. Freud
assessed the goal or function of repetitive play as follows:
It is clear that in their play children repeat everything that has made a great
impression on them in real life, and that in doing so they abreact the strength
of the impression and . . . make themselves master of the situation . . . As the
child passes over from the passivity of the experience to the activity of the
game, he hands on the disagreeable experience to one of his playmates and in
this way revenges himself on a substitute. (Ibid. 16–17)
The game of disappearance-return is an example of reversal expressing
diametric structured behaviour and experience. This mirror image
reversal is not a cancelling of one pole by the other. Both coexist
in an uneasy tension. Elsewhere, Freud recognised that mirror image
inversions in dreams are not necessarily related to pathology, being
prevalent in birth-dreams, and ‘contrariwise’, ‘just the reverse’ dreams
(Freud 1900, 526; 439); once again, this implies a spatial logic or
discourse.
In the Schreber case of psychosis, Freud describes a series of
reversals or diametric structured inverted symmetries, the ‘combination
of reverential subordination and rebellious resistance . . . found in
Schreber’s relationship to his God’ (Freud 2002, 40). This chain or
system of reversals includes Schreber’s mission from God as redeemer
of the world, God becoming a persecutor and Schreber mocking God.
Encrustation of experience within a diametric space process took the
forms of a series of reversals and mirror image splits into heightened
diametric experience (see also Freud 2002, 39, on Schreber’s splits into
‘upper’ and ‘lower’ God, and ‘upper’ and ‘middle’ Flechsig). That these
diametric spatial features of inversion go far beyond the Schreber case
for paranoia and psychosis is evident from Freud’s following position:
The pathological process in paranoia . . . makes use of the mechanism of
projection . . . The typical case of such a conflict is one between the two
members of a pair of opposites – the case of an ambivalent attitude, which
we have examined in detail as it appears in someone mourning the death of a
loved relative. (Freud 1912–13, 92)
Two of the reversals expressing inverted symmetry of diametric
structural projections in Schreber are also arguably largely consistent
with obsessional neurosis. These include Freud’s words regarding
Schreber:
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Before he was inclined towards sexual asceticism and was a doubter with
respect to God, while after the illness had taken its course, he became a
believer in God and devoted to voluptuousness. (Freud 2002, 21)
and
the tone of the emotion turned into its opposite; the individual now hated
and feared as a result of his persecution was once loved and admired. The
persecution established by the delusion serves above all to justify the patient’s
emotional transformation . . . his attitude towards him has in the meantime
diametrically changed. (Ibid. 32, italics mine)
These reversals operate largely within the diametric structure itself
rather than beyond this structure. Both reversals are defensive modes
of a withdrawal into an increasingly more restrictive spatial structure
underlying and governing experience. Diametric structures of mirror
image reversals provide a corralling of flows of energy. In Freud’s
neglected graphology, an implicit danger is that repressive diametric
spatial structural projections colonize experience and the unconscious.
What emerges here from Freud’s accounts is not only two levels
of diametric spatial structured experience (in obsessional neurosis and
psychosis) in repression and the unconscious; a clear implication from
Freud’s accounts is that a consistent chain or system of diametric
structured spatial relations pervades the unconscious. It is evident that
diametric spatial features are inextricably entwined with repressed,
reactive to trauma, features of the unconscious as a system. In other
words, the variable life histories’ causal effects produce a system level
response in the unconscious of a diametric structured spatial background
for experience in both obsessional neurosis and psychosis, though with
perhaps different functions for each diametric process. Development in
experience is a movement in excess of diametric spatial structures that
are bound within the restricted domain of a mirror image relation.
The question arises as to whether diametric spatial relations are a
circumscribed part of another wider spatial mode of relation; a relation
that is more than simply a horizonless opening and not simply a defiance
of the limitations of the restricted space of diametric relations.
*
Derrida’s discourse on the ‘archive’ in the unconscious offers a challenge
to a truth located in linear historical time as being fundamental; it is a
rejection, as so much else of his work, of simple narratives of origin.
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A Derridean critique would focus on the limitations of this diametric
spatial mirror image symmetry as logocentric repression founding the
construction of subjectivity. Though allowing for some division within
repression, and acknowledging that mirror image inversion amounts to
a challenge to Western logocentric principles of non-contradiction, a
Derridean perspective would consider diametric spatial relation as being
too static and requiring a prior background dynamism and structure of
difference for the unconscious. Freud does recognise that these diametric
structured reversals are problematic and in need of working through for
change. They are the hidden spaces of repression upon which subjectivity
is constructed: a restricted space, a confined site for integration through
mirror image symmetries.
The mirror image construction of subjectivity, as part of a Freudian
logocentric repression, does not go far enough for Derrida. While
diametric spatial inversions offer a step forward in providing a spatial
discourse or graphematics, Derrida would accentuate the limitations of
such diametric mirror image truths as being chained within a Western
metaphysics of knowledge as sight going back to Plato. Nick Mansfield
(2000) locates Derrida as part of what he provisionally describes as an
anti-subjective tradition that highlights the illusionary certainty of this
historical construct. On this reading of diametric mirror image relations,
the inverted image is a constructed truth which may be illusory. The
lapse into mirror image split relations is an occlusion of a prior truth.
Movement is needed from diametric mirror image inversion in excess
of this restricted diametric spatial realm. This interruption of diametric
mirror image space by another invites an opening towards other spaces
such as concentric relations. These provide not stable fixities but rather
tendencies and directions for experience within a larger fluctuating
system of processes. Moreover, it is to be recognised that power is not
somehow separate from or subsequent to the construction of the subject
as a diametric spatial site of experience. The locus of power is built into
the diametric spatial polarity itself, in the tension between both poles in
mirror image inversion of the other.
Yet any possible movement away from diametric spatial relation
towards other spatial modes, such as concentric relation, requires
clarification of the features through which these spatial modes can
mutually interact and even replace each other. Beyond mirror image
symmetry, a framework is required to be developed that allows for
interaction and movement between diametric space and other spaces,
such as concentric spatial relation, in order to move beyond a Freudian
logocentric repression. Concentric spatial relation does also offer an
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example of symmetry but not of inverted symmetry; the symmetrical
reflection in concentric polarity is the same pole not the other different
pole as in diametric polarity. The contrast is between diametric
symmetry as inversion and concentric symmetry as unity. Thus,
though different in their kinds of symmetry, diametric and concentric
spatial relations share a common domain of discourse with regard to
symmetry.
For Derrida, the space itself of the archive is in some way divided
and ‘there is no archive without a place of consignation, without a
technique of repetition and without a certain exterior’ (Derrida 1996a,
1). This division within memory, traces of memory and traces of the
archive, ‘that objectivizable storage called the archive’ (Ibid. 26), invites
a concomitant focus on an absence in claims of presence. This invites
further interrogation of issues of division, separation, interaction and
connection, as well as repetition, both in Freudian conceptions of the
unconscious and in going beyond logocentric repression to another
domain of relevance.
It is this dimension of separation and connection which invites a
discourse pertinent to diametric and concentric spatial relation. Beyond
mirror image inverted symmetry, Lévi-Strauss overlooked another
key relational entailment of diametric dualism, namely, that both
oppositional realms are basically detached and can be further smoothly
detached from the other. A spatial relation of diametric dualism assumes
separation and any connection between the parts is on the basis of
this assumed separation (Downes 2003; 2010; 2011). A key relative
difference between diametric and concentric relations, overlooked by
Lévi-Strauss’ empiricism, is ascertainable in principle. It is evident that
the inner and outer poles of concentric dualism are inextricably attached
to each other, unlike in diametric dualism; both concentric poles coexist
in the same space, and thus, the outer circle overlaps the space of the
inner one. The outer circle surrounds and contains the inner circle. The
opposite that is within the outer circle or shape cannot detach itself from
being within this outer shape. Notwithstanding that the outer circle or
shape can move in the direction of greater detachment from the inner
circle, it cannot, in principle, fully detach itself from the inner circle
in concentric relation (even if the inner circle becomes an increasingly
smaller proportion of the outer). Full detachment could conceivably
occur only through destroying or altering the form of the other pole.
Full detachment could occur only through destroying the very concentric
nature of the whole relation itself. Concentric spatial relation invokes an
alterity that is not reducible to simple opposition. In contradistinction, in
Developing Derrida’s Psychoanalytic Graphology 207
diametric dualism both oppositional realms are basically detached and
can be further smoothly detached from the other.
These conclusions operate for both dualisms, whether they are viewed
as being two-dimensional, or three-dimensional. A concentric dualism
assumes connection between its parts and any separation is on the basis
of assumed connection, whereas diametric dualism assumes separation
and any connection between the parts is on the basis of this assumed
separation (Downes 2003, 2010). As structures in relational difference,
this contrast is a relativistic one of degree.
The contours of a Derridean text prior to Freud’s logocentric
repression give expression not only to the interconnectedness of
space and time as an interplay, but also bring an intensification of
concentration on dimensions of rupture and connection:
Temporality as spacing will be not only the horizontal discontinuity of a chain
of signs, but also will be writing as the interruption and restoration of contact
between the various depths of psychical levels: the remarkably heterogenous
temporal fabric of psychical work itself. (Derrida 1981, 225)
This focus on interruption is an expansion of the two-way repressive
movements highlighted by Freud (1925–26) in mirror image symmetry
for obsessional neurosis. Derrida seeks a wider view of systemic
repression and connection, as a series of interruptions and restorations at
different heterogeneous levels. This wider view gains some succour also
from Freud’s acknowledgement that ‘instead of a single repression we
have found a collection of them’ (Freud 1925–26, 107). A Derridean
background questioning involves examination of the differences and
connections between these systemic collections of repressions. It
highlights the need for concentrating on how to relate and not relate
these repressions to each other as structures of difference.
Interruption and restoration implicates both diametric spatial process
dimensions of assumed separation and concentric spatial projections
of assumed connection. A view of spacing as dynamic leads to
the proposed psychoanalytic graphology of diametric and concentric
spatial differential relation through this focus on interruption and
restoration – assumed separation and assumed connection – as pervading
the different heterogeneous aspects of the unconscious. Interaction
between diametric and concentric spaces of assumed separation and
connection respectively requires this wider systemic focus of Derrida,
amplifying Freud, on relations between collections of repressions. The
divisions in these collections of repressions encompass what Derrida
(1996a) refers to as ‘archive fever’, as contradictions in a divided
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archive of the unconscious, what he describes as ‘the ungraspable and
invisible difference between breaches’ (Derrida 1981, 201) in the trace
as memory.
Repression and the unconscious is for Derrida a dynamic process of
archivization. Suggesting that ‘the archivization produces as much as it
records the event’ (Derrida 1996a, 17), Derrida argues that Freud
wants to exhume a more archaic impression, he wants to exhibit a more
archaic imprint than the one the other archaeologists of all kinds bustle
around, those of literature and those of classical objective science . . . an
impression that is almost no longer an archive but almost confuses itself with
the pressure of the footstep that leaves its still-living mark on a substrate, a
surface, a place of origin. (Ibid. 97)
The process dimensions of concentric assumed connection and diametric
assumed separation provide a level of systemic interactions between
the various depths of psychic levels. These systemic interactions emerge
whether in moving beyond the mirror image symmetries in neurosis and
more radical splits of assumed separation in psychosis, or in relating
constellations emerging from reactions to external events to a prior
spatial organizing principle to repression in unconscious relations. They
offer a spatial interplay for engaging with difference between breaches
in systems of repression and memory.
Though Klein (1997a; 1997b) gives this more extreme emphasis,
repression as a process of splitting or assumed separation is a central
feature of Freud’s understanding; even beyond assumptions of a
repressive split underlying the divided poles of mirror image inversions.
Freud’s account of the history of the psychoanalytic movement states,
in relation to his framework at the end of the Breuer period, that ‘I
looked upon psychical splitting itself as an effect of a process of repelling
which at that time I called “defence”, and later, “repression”’(Freud
1914–16, 11). Much later, Freud also explores a ‘splitting of the ego in
the process of defence’ discussing ‘a rift in the ego which never heals but
which increases as time goes on’ (Freud 1937–39, 276). That splitting
or assumed separation is, for Freud, not simply an outcome but also
a process associated with repression can be seen in his The Ego and
the Id where he argues: ‘The repressed is only cut off sharply from
the ego by the resistances of repression’ (Freud 1923, 24). From this,
it is evident that the assumed separation of diametric spatial structures
gives expression to a key feature of repression as a splitting process
and that diametric space offers both a structure and a dynamic process
of inducing assumed separation in its movement and projection. The
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proposed interplay between diametric and concentric spatial relations
invites movement towards healing these splits, towards a concentric
assumed connection to interrupt, overcome and reconstruct the assumed
separation of repressive diametric relations.
Freud (1920) hypothesised that the function of repetition compulsion
antedated the pleasure principle. Building on the edifice of Freud,
Derrida describes ‘[a] compulsive, repetitive and nostalgic desire for the
archive, an irrepressible desire to return to the origin, a homesickness,
a nostalgia for the return to the most archaic place of absolute
commencement’ (Derrida 1996a, 91). Whether this is equivalent with
Freud’s compulsion to repeat or otherwise, conceptualizing both
diametric and concentric spatial structures dynamically, as projections,
requires recognition that a repetition and return takes place through
such projections. The dynamic process of constructing such projections
upon experience and the environment, and within the system of the
unconscious, is itself a process of repetition: of repeating the structure
being projected by means of the projection. Thus, envisaged as a
structural projection, the diametric spatial relation is both a structure
and a dynamic process imposing itself upon its environment. Likewise
concentric spatial structures and concentric spatial processes project
themselves dynamically upon their environment. Projection is itself
an attempt to return to a prior state of affairs, namely, to the
projected structure itself. It is a pre-causal process. Through projection
this diametric spatial structure both repeats itself and engages in a
diametric process of turning relations into diametric structures. The
diametric process is an attempted return to the origin of the diametric
structure; it is a spatial movement towards a static, diametric structural
relation. This movement is under the dominion of diametric structured
spatial projections dictating to the unconscious. And similarly, an event
and ongoing process of return occurs with the different direction of
concentric spatial projections.
It is apparent that a key feature of concentric and diametric spatial
discourses is that they are mutually interactive movements. They are
structures of relation but also structures in relation, and are not simply
separate individual structures but are interlinked so that increase in one
is compensated for by decrease in the other. Concentric spatial structures
give way to diametric ones and vice-versa in a relativistic relational
process. As each is a displacement and deferral of the other, the mutual
tension in which they are held brings a resistance to either existing in
full presence. Lévi-Strauss observed that both dualisms tended to co-
exist in ‘functional relation’ (Lévi-Strauss 1977, 73). This echoes the
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structuralist insight that meaning for other systems, such as language,
occurs through relational difference, rather than in a single term. Yet
Lévi-Strauss only explicated in rudimentary form any meaning given
expression through these structures of differential relation. A spatial
discourse of implication needs further development to extract spatial
entailments. This amplification resonates with Derrida’s account that
‘psychic life is neither the transparency of meaning nor the opacity of
force but the difference within the exertion of forces’ (Derrida 1981,
201).
The relational differences between concentric and diametric dualism
are not qualities that are in some way essential or intrinsic to either
structure, considered as individual isolated structures; they are not to
be abstracted from the context of their mutual relation. In Derridean
terms, the key dynamic is not in the individual structures but in their
structural traces of differential relation, as aspects of a potentially
open chain of differential structures, as part of a dynamic process of
directional movement. It is not an attempt to find static categories
which cohere. Whereas Derrida interprets Freud as wanting ‘to think
force and place simultaneously’ and views ‘differences in the work
of breaching’ as concerning ‘not only forces but also locations’ (Ibid.
204), a basically similar concern with a simultaneous interplay between
directional and positional dimensions to diametric and concentric spaces
exists for current purposes. Derrida focuses on the relation of sameness
and difference in relationship:
What is the division of being between the same and the other? Is it a division
between the same and the other, which does not suppose, at very least, that
the same is the other’s other, and the other the same as oneself ? (Ibid. 127)
Concentric and diametric structures of relation offer models of
sameness and otherness – of assumed connection and separation –which
accommodate conceptions of sameness and difference. They offer
dynamic structures of differential relation. However, it must be noted
that Derrida endeavours to avoid placing a reified image before the
idea; this serves as an important warning against reduction of concentric
and diametric relation to merely abstract decontextualised schemata.
Derrida eschews abstract essences, whether essences are postulated as
categories (Sayer 1997) or otherwise, his is a quest for a space that is
non-cognitive or at least a precognitive threshold; a space always already
deferred. A movement more radical than reliance on the visual, aural or
haptic is needed, being neither in thrall to metaphysics, nor mourning
the certainty of binary opposition. This invites examination of a spatial
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dimension that is in some way prior to everyday sight and beyond
a metaphysical tradition reliant on the sensory-nonsensory distinction
going back to antiquity with Plato. Significantly, dimensions of diametric
spatial relation as assumed separation and concentric spatial relation as
assumed connection open up a site of interaction that is not contingent
of visual metaphors of light.
As an interactive spatial mode with diametric space, concentric
relation provides a spatial opening that includes affect and also provides
a dynamic spatial movement in this interactive mode of relation. As
a projection of possibility, it is a dynamic process as much as a
static structure. However, an opening from diametric and towards
concentric spatial structures of experience and relation is by no means
a deterministic or simple teleological process. A shift from diametric
spatial structures also invites the danger of a further fragmentation
and splitting in this restructuring, so that the turning open toward
concentric spatial relation may not necessarily come forth. It is not
simply that a loss of meaning may occur in the horizon shift away from
diametric spatial relation; concentric directions of opening need not be
confined to injunctions towards meaning making. Whereas concentric
spatial movements unsettle the fixities of diametric spatial relations,
this is not reducible to a purpose of finding a different static mould
or cognitive mapping for truth, reality or experience. The directions
of the contours of this different experiential angle of relation than the
diametric do not map in linear fashion onto a correspondent cognitive
construction of reality. As Heidegger would describe it, a questioning of
being is not reducible to a mere hypostatized worldview. It is not, for
Derrida, a return to a simple naive origin or home. Derrida’s search for
a psychoanalytic graphology is a quest for a spatial membrane that is
not mere matter invested with logocentric values of thingness; neither is
it a conception of reality opposed to the idea.
*
Lévi-Strauss’ reliance on an analogy between the structure of myths and
that of structural linguistics has been strongly questioned (e.g., Caton
1987). While his epistemology for diametric dualism is drawn from
linguistics, this does not require that the cross-cultural observations of
diametric dualism be confined to examination from a paradigm drawn
from linguistics. Arguably, it was the very cage of this paradigm that
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prevented Lévi-Strauss from expanding upon the proposed affective
dimensions for this structure of relation. It is important to emphasise
that Lévi-Strauss’ account of diverse empirical observations of diametric
spatial dualisms as mirror image inverted symmetry is but one part of
his structural anthropological project. The examination of diametric and
concentric projection for this proposed new psychoanalytic graphology
is to develop a position beyond Lévi-Strauss, rather than simply echoing
his fundamental assumptions.
There is also a need to go beyond a conception of Derrida as being
either for or against the work of Lévi-Strauss. Most of Lévi-Strauss’
structuralism can be safely discarded for the contours of Derridean
concerns; a process of critique of Lévi-Strauss is necessary to pave the
way for the neglected apogée of his thought concerning spatial relations.
The scope of Derrida’s critique of Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism is
wide and varied. These objections include from universalist and
teleological claims, to reification of structures (so that structure becomes
confused with meaning), to a nostalgia for origins and innocence, to a
structuralism bound by the subject-object relation, to a transcendence as
totality – echoing Jean-Francois Lyotard’s critique of metanarratives – to
the certainty of grounded structures where ‘the entire history of the
concept of structure’ must be thought of as ‘a series of substitutions
of center for center’ (Derrida 1981, 279). Derrida’s search is for
an ‘opening which will frustrate the structuralist project’ (Ibid. 160).
Derrida’s questioning of the ‘structurality of structure’ (Ibid. 278) in
Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism, is a background self-referential questioning
resonant with early Heidegger’s questioning of the temporalizing of
temporality, and scrutiny of the status of the background relation
between the ideal and the real, as itself being real or ideal (to move
beyond a chimeric hegemony of one pole over the other). Derrida’s
entirely other text necessitates a space beyond such binary opposition.
Derrida’s critique of reification regarding structure raises further
distinctions between the thought of the structure itself, speech or
language describing the structure, and experience of the structure.
He indicts the reification of structures as ‘confusing meaning with its
geometric, morphological, or in the best of cases, cinematic model’ (Ibid.
16), where ‘structure becomes the object itself, the literary thing itself.
It is no longer . . . a heuristic instrument’ (Ibid. 15). Yet these criticisms
apply not only to structures but to all images.
It is worth emphasizing, however, that Lévi-Strauss argues for an
interplay between structure and content in contrast to formalism1. In
the words of Lévi-Strauss:
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Contrary to formalism, structuralism refuses to set the concrete against the
abstract . . . Form is defined by opposition to material other than itself. But
structure has no distinct content; it is content itself, apprehended in a logical
organisation conceived as property of the real. (Lévi-Strauss 1977, 115)
This not only advances Lévi-Strauss’ position beyond a reified view of
structures. Images as reifications locked within assumptions of a subject-
object dualism invite the question as to the possibility of space which is
not simply at the level of reified images. This requires acknowledgment,
however, of Derrida’s cautionary note that thought concerning space
cannot be equated in cursory fashion with language on space or
experience of space.
Derrida rightly challenges some statements of Lévi-Strauss which
have no direct relation to spatial concerns, such as the latter’s view
that ‘the sum of . . . knowledge’ in the Western world prior to ‘the
invention of writing and the birth of modern science’ has gone ‘up
and down’ rather than having ‘a steady increase’ (Derrida 1997, 129).
He problematises the very conception of a quantity of knowledge and
exposes Lévi-Strauss’ assertion as being neither true nor false but simply
meaningless; it is bereft of construct validity. Derrida (1997) goes on
to reject Lévi-Strauss’ nostalgia for lost origins and assumptions of an
original innocence and natural goodness in primitive tribes such as
the Nambikwara. This deconstruction challenges the view of violence
being derivative from a prior innocence. Here Derrida is, in effect,
avoiding a diametric oppositional split between a phase of innocence and
subsequent violence. Another aspect of reification criticised by Derrida is
the tendency to place the idea before the experience, putting ‘the notion
of an Idea or “interior design” as simply anterior to a work which
would supposedly be the expression of it’; this is ‘a prejudice: a prejudice
of the traditional criticism called idealist’ (Derrida 1981, 11). Yet a
spatial background interplay is being sought by Derrida, so that it is not
simply a question of rejecting all forms of dynamic structural relation.
Furthermore, Derrida has an objection to structuralism’s ‘preestablished’
teleological framework (Ibid. 25).
The epistemological commitments underlying Lévi-Strauss’ cross-
cultural observations of concentric and diametric dualism require
modification, in order to relate them to Derrida’s entirely other text.
Lévi-Strauss’ reliance on an analogy between the structure of myths and
that of structural linguistics has been strongly questioned (Caton 1987).
While his epistemology for the dualisms is drawn from linguistics, this
does not require that the concentric and diametric spatial structures
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of relation, and their relative differences, be confined to examination
only from within an epistemological paradigm drawn from linguistics.
Arguably, it was the very cage of this paradigm that prevented Lévi-
Strauss from expanding upon the proposed spatial-psychoanalytical
uncovering of these structures of differential relation.
These ancient structures of-relation-in-relation share with language
the feature of being a trans-subjective system of relations. However,
as a discourse of implication this does not make the spatial dualisms
reducible to a linguistic system. Paths are to be developed which lead
far beyond Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism in giving rise to the implicit
spatial discourse of diametric and concentric differential relation. In
making such steps, the relational differences between concentric and
diametric spatial movements are, most importantly, not being subsumed
within the Procrustean bed of Lévi-Strauss’ search for Cartesian mental
structures, noted by Eugene D’Aquili (1975). While Lévi-Strauss’
account of diverse empirical observations of concentric and diametric
spatial dualisms is but one small part of his structural anthropological
project, the argument being developed for current purposes is not one
which requires commitment to accepting other aspects of Lévi-Strauss’
work.2
The proposed pre-linguistic spatial discourse of implication is not
reducible to silent gestures, that is, socially constructed non-verbal
communication. Without necessarily having to endorse a Beckettian
minimalism with regard to language, it is possible to at least partially
identify this silent, pre-linguistic spatial opening of the trace of diametric
and concentric spatial relations, with Samuel Beckett’s quest for the
numinous:
As we cannot eliminate language all at once, we should at least leave
nothing undone that might contribute to its falling into disrepute. To bore
one hole after another in it, until what lurks behind it – be it something or
nothing – begins to seep through. (Beckett 1983, 172)
Fluid spaces of concentric relation are part of an interplay with diametric
structures, as holes lurking behind language. In Derrida’s evocative
words, this movement, ‘give[s] voice to the dynamis of a silence’ (Derrida
1981, 165). This space invites a silence, a movement that invokes – but
is not reducible to – aural dimensions, and is not reducible merely to a
Western visual metaphysics.
It is evident that diametric and concentric spatial relations are not
only a system of relations interacting within itself. Their traces are
also projected into other systems of relation such as language and
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behaviour. They offer a domain of interactions that is prior to causal
level explanations, prior to intentionality, and prior to language systems,
yet interacting with them.
*
A notable feature of this proposed psychoanalytic graphology is
that the interplay between diametric and concentric spaces offers a
movement beyond the subject-object dualism in this reconstruction
of subjectivity pertaining to unconscious structures of experience.
Exploring boundaries between subjectivity and objectivity in repression
and the unconscious, Derrida tentatively enters into a space before the
subject-object relation, ‘the pressure of the printing, the impression,
before the division between the printed and the printer’ (Derrida 1996a,
18). The printer and the printed (including the image) exist against a
prior background space of relation; printer and printed are arrested
effects upon a prior space.
Early Heideggerian themes, woven into the tapestry of Derrida’s
thought, include: problematization of a truth prior to the subject-
object relation of the printer and the printed; a dimension of
temporality invoked as pivotal to understanding this truth; and Derrida’s
reconciliation with an affective dimension, thereby implicating an
affinity with Heideggerian care and ekstatic time. This printer-printed,
footstep-substrate, subject-object relation is unfolded by Derrida
through a dimension of time, the ‘instant’: ‘In the instant when the
imprint is yet to be left, abandoned by the pressure of the impression.
In the instant of the pure auto-affection, in the indistinction of the active
and the passive, of a touching and the touched’ (Derrida 1996a, 98).
Derrida searches for a language to overcome the subject-object
dualism, when seeking to locate a primordial impression, while a
temporal framework, as the ‘instant’, is invoked. While Ian Hunter
(2006) argues that Derrida’s structure of difference cannot be outside
history, it would seem that for Derrida here, like the early Heidegger
(1962), there is a temporal mode prior to linear historical time. Derrida’s
rejection of origins is not a rejection of some spatio-temporal realm of
purity, of ‘pure auto-affection’. Derrida continues:
where the singular imprint . . . barely distinguishes itself from
the impression . . . this is the condition of singularity .. . . It is the condition
for the uniqueness of the printer-printed, of the impression and the imprint,
of the pressure and its trace in the unique instant where they are not yet
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distinguished the one from the other .. . . The trace no longer distinguishes
itself from its substrate. No longer distinguishing between themselves, this
pressure and this imprint differ henceforth from all other impressions, from
all other imprints, and from all other archives. (Derrida 1996a, 99)
Derrida’s interrogation of Freudian repression and memory seeks to
go beyond the printer and the printed. The printer dimension serves as
a condensed account of the causal history, the event impacting upon
memory and repression of memory in the unconscious. This shift in
focus away from the printer (causal event) resonates with criticisms of
psychoanalysis as being the production of a subject, in conjunction with
the specific set of familial and social relations dominant in the culture of
Freud’s time (Olsen & Køppe 1988; Mansfield 2000). Derrida is interro-
gating a level prior to the external, socially constructed causal history of
the printed; he is going beyond a focus on events and the reaction to the
event as the ‘printed’ memory or repression. Another significant feature
of this shift of interest beyond the causal event ‘printed’ in relation
to repression is as follows: neither Derrida’s ambit of relevance nor
that of the proposed psychoanalytic graphology of interaction between
diametric and concentric spatial relations are confined to a Freudian
preoccupation with repression and castration anxiety. Furthermore,
they are not a preoccupation with other dimensions which Freud (1926)
locates as central to repression (as distinct from other wider unconscious
defences), such as genital fixation as causal sources of repression and the
myth of the Oedipus complex in relation to repression. The graphology
concerns are pre-causal and pre-mythic.
Derrida’s quest is for a spatio-temporal organising principle prior to
event-memory and not simply reducible to the reactive psychic constella-
tion of the printed. The trace of the reactive constellation of the printed
engages in some key relation with what Derrida calls the ‘substrate’.
What is the spatial structure or structuralizing process of this unique
instant and substrate? What is the rationality, if any, underlying this
prior temporal and spatial relation, before the division into impression
and imprint, subject and object? It is important here to draw attention
to a clear difference between Derrida’s and Freud’s understanding of the
trace; the printed differs notably from Freud’s (1925) account in a Note
upon the ‘Mystic Writing Pad’. Freud (1925, 227; 230) conceptualises
the traces upon the unconscious as being ‘permanent’, as observed also
in passing by Derrida (1981, 204). In stark contrast to this later empha-
sis of Freud (though not to that of Freud’s 1896 letter to Fliess, which
Derrida in Writing and Difference quotes in terms of memory-traces
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Table 1Key Dimensions of a proposed Psychoanalytic Graphology.
Diametric Concentric Freudian Repression Derridean Divided
Spatial Spatial Archive and System of
Relation Relation Traces as a Spatio-
Temporal Organising
Principle Prior
to Event-Memory
(Printer-Printed)
Mirror Image Symmetry Wolf Man Inversions Restricted Construction
Inverted as Unity –Obsessional Neurosis of Western Subjectivity
Symmetry Inversions a General through Visual
Feature of Obsessional Metaphors; Beyond
Neurosis (Freud 1926) Restricted Space of
Schreber Case Inversions Logocentric Repression
-Psychosis (Freud 1911) and Narrowed
Construction of Western
Subjectivity
Assumed Assumed Repression as Interruptions and
Separation Connection Splitting (Freud 1914; Restorations in Breaches/
1923; 1940) Contradictions of a
Divided Archive in
Collections of
Repressions
subjected to a rearrangement), Derrida opens up a dynamic background
realm of interaction with the trace to challenge its permanency: ‘The
trace is the erasure of selfhood, of one’s own presence, and is consti-
tuted by the threat or anguish of its irremediable disappearance, of the
disappearance of its disappearance. An unerasable trace is not a trace,
it is a full presence’ (Derrida 1981, 230). Derridean erasure of the trace
is conceptualized explicitly in structural terms in relation to repression:
This erasure of the trace is not only an accident that can occur here or
there, nor is it even the necessary structure of a determined censorship
threatening a given presence; it is the very structure which makes possible,
as the movement of temporalization and pure auto-affection, something that
can be called repression in general, the original synthesis of original repression
and secondary repression, repression “itself”. (Ibid. 230)
It is a structure which makes possible. The deconstructor par excellence
allows for a dimension of purity; it contains the auto-affection dimension
of the ‘instant’, that prior relation to the printer and printed, a mode
of relation prior to the subject-object dualism. As a movement it is a
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directional structure crossing out other spatial structures. The structure
of différance, the erasure of the trace in the instant between the
impression and the imprint, is an erasure of a present non-origin. This
invites strong resonances with the spatio-temporal structures unseating
diametric mirror image symmetry.
The diametric spatial projection as a mirror image organising
unconscious patterns of relation and repression for neurosis and
psychosis in Freud’s accounts offers a starting point for this prior
spatial process of erasure. Envisaged as a dynamic spatial process, a
further concentric spatial movement is needed to interact with diametric
spatial relations, bringing a greater opening and interaction with
background stimuli. In doing so, diametric spatial projections become
unseated and potentially subject to erasure. Detailed consideration of the
relation between erasure of the trace and this proposed psychoanalytic
graphology of interactions between diametric and concentric spaces
across respective dimensions of symmetry, separation and connection,
is a task for another day.
Derrida notes that, ‘[m]y work does not . . . destroy the subject;
it simply tries to resituate it’ (Derrida 1995, 175)3. This proposed
psychoanalytic graphology engages with a presubjective expansion from
repressive diametric spatial relations to challenge the construction of a
restricted subjectivity. It is envisaged as a discourse pertaining to a more
radical displacement and deferral than Freud’s logocentric repression.
A common spatial domain of relevance has been uncovered for diverse
features of Freudian repression, including aspects of ambivalence in
obsessional neurosis and psychosis, splitting of the ego, and the compul-
sion to repeat. This graphological domain has been developed through
a range of dynamic interactive dimensions for diametric and concentric
spatial movements, across common thematic concerns of Derrida and
Freud, such as inversions, interruption and restoration, in their accounts
of traces in systems of repression in the unconscious. In doing so, an
expansion beyond a Freudian logocentric repression has been offered,
resonant with Derrida’s call for a wider spatio-temporal understanding
of structures of differential relation, prior to causality and myth.
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Notes
1. Tim Mooney (2003) relates Derrida’s understanding of empiricism to a form-
content schema more primordial than perception and within which discrete
impressions or sense-data receive associative overlays that unify them and render
them meaningful. See Derrida 1967 and 1973. It is the interchangeability of form
and content that needs further explication in relation to spatial concerns.
2. While the dynamic interaction between spatial structures of differential relation
of concentric and diametric dualism requires apprehension of a framework of
both space and time, Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist framework is usually interpreted
as excluding both space and time. Thus, for example, Roman Jakobsen’s (1973,
38–9) structuralist account observes the exclusion of time and space from
Saussure’s conception of linguistic system which influenced Lévi-Strauss, while
Lévi-Strauss’ (1966, 254) himself explicitly rejected Jean-Paul Sartre’s emphasis
that all truth is historically conditioned. The issue of the temporal dimension
under which movement between concentric and diametric spatial relation needs
scrutiny is as an attempt to relate it to the historical without equating it with
linear history. See also Allinson (2003) for an account of the need to go beyond
Kantian a priori assumptions that space and time are not interconnected, and also
Downes (2005) for a critical review of Allinson’s account.
3. As Christopher Norris notes, Derrida accepts ‘conventions of authenticity . . .
Their effects in day to day discourse can hardly be questioned’ (Norris 1982,
111; 128).
